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Managers  are typically  the inspiration  and moving  force  behind
change.  Workers'  Councils  play  at best  a facilitating  role.  To get
firms to make necessary  changes,  it is essential to change the
incentive  sSructure  at the firm level.
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State enterprise  behavior  and reform  have  emerged  as  from inflationary  gains on once-off  inventory  sales,
key issues in the emerging  market  economies  of  devaluation  gains  on enterprise  dotlar  accounts,  and
Eastern Europe  because  of the size of the state  implicit  input  subsidies  from CMEA  trade.
manufacturing  sector  as measured  by its share  in  *  Banks were  lax in enforcing  creditworthiness,
GDP, exports,  and tax revenues.  The difficulties  leading  to an adverse  selection  problem  marked  by
experienced  by Polish  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  loans going  mainly  to "bad" firmns.
in adjusting  and responding  to the new economic  - State-owned  enterprises  tend to be myopic,  with
environment  have led to fiscal  imbalance,  deteriorat-  considerable  shon-run  pressure  on wages  that works
ing portfolios  of commercial  banks, and burgeoning  to the detriment  of restructuring  investments  essential
interfirm  payment  arrears.  for  reducing  energy  and material  intensity  and
Pinto, Belka,  and Krajewski  examine  the  product  redesign.
economic  and behavioral  reactions  of a significant  * Nominal  and real wages  both  displayed  remark-
sample  of Poland's largest SOEs  to the macroeco-  able flexibility.  Employment  reduction  has lagged
nomic  reforms  introduced  as part of the "big bang" in  output  reduction  partly  because  partial  indexation  of
January 1990.  They track the evolution  of output,  wages  to inflation  has kept real wages  low  and partly
costs,  and profits,  and examine  wage setting  behavior,  because  of the natural  reluctance  of worker-controlled
enterprise  debt dynamics,  and enforcement  of the  SOEs to shed labor. So, there  is clear possibility  of
"'micro"  hard  budget constraint  by banks.  They  much higher  transitional  unemployment  once
conduct  a firm-level  analysis  of the export  boom and  privatdzation  and commercialization  get underway  on
its causes  and document  the evolving  tax burden  on  a large scale.
enterprises.  Their  findings  are based on a survey  of 75  . TMe  hard-currency  export boom  in 1990  was
large SOEs  in manufacturing  during  June 1989  - motivated  more  by slack  domestic  demand  than
March 1991  - six months  prior to and 15 months  higher  export profitability.
following  the big bang.  The main qualitative  change is a definite  attitudi-
Some  of the main quandtative  conclusions  were:  nal shift  in favor of profits  and marketing  in contrast
The high nominal  interest  rate on working  capital  to the old exclusive  emphasis  on production  targets.
(from 50 to 72 percent for the month  of January 1990  But  there is a serious  principal-agent  problem,  with
alone) inhibited  borrowing  and motivated  firms  to pay  managers  serving  at the pleasure  of the workers'
off zloty loans,  leading  to a squeeze  on working  council  and no obvious  owner  stressing  long-term
capital.  The huge decline  in  real wages  led to a  viability  considerations  in  decisionmaking.
demand shock,  witnessed  by rising finished  goods  The paper concludes  by discussing  the
inventories.  Consequently,  the initial,  unexpectedly  microeconomics  of transformation  needed  to comple-
large,  decline in output  could be explained  by a  ment  the largely  macroeconomic  big bang. The
combination  of nominal  interest  rate shock  and  importance  of addressing  firm-level  managerial
standard  demand  considerations.  incentives  and empowering  managers  is emphasized
f  High profits  in 1990  were temporary,  stemming  in the transition  to eventual  privatization.
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READING  LIST  42Glossary  of Terms
1.  Profit II or Pre-tax profit ("wynik finansowy  brutto") = Sales +  Other Income - Cost of Sales
- Turnover tax + Balance  of extraordinary  gains and losses
2.  Other Income = subsidies + income from sales and leasing of assets
3.  Net Sales = Sales - Turnover tax.
4.  Balance  of extraordinary  gains and losses ("net extraordinary  gains") are mainly devaluation
gains on dollar accounts (late 1989)  and penal.y interest on interfirm credit arrears as well as
arrears to banks and tax arrears to the budget.
5.  Underlying Profitability = (profit II - other income - net extraordinary  gains)/Net Sales.
6.  Net income = profit II - corporate income tax.
7.  Disposable cash =  net income -dividends + depreciation.
Other Notes
1.  Excess wage tax is also called "popiwek"  or by its acronym, PPWW.
2.  Quarters are indicated  by Roman  numerals, e.g.,  1990:IV is fourth quarter, 1990.
3.  SOE is "state-owned  enterprise".
(*) Brian Pinto is at the World Bank.  Marek Belka and Stefan Kra,ewski are, Professors of Economics at Lodz University,
Poland.  A first version of this rport,  which contains the findings of a quantitative study of 75 large Polish SOEs
supplemented by manager interviews, was distributed under the title 'Microconomic  response to the Economic
Transformation Program: Evidence from the largest Polish SOEs" in September 1991.  World Bank funding from the
Europe and Central Asia Region and from Research Administration under RP0#67658  is gratefuly  acknowledged.  The
inspirational guidance of Stan WcUliaz,  the help and advice of Anna Krajewska and the excellent research assistance of
Robert Sierhej were indispensable in producing the report.  The support and guidance of [an Hume and comments from
Luca Barbone, Tim Lane, Ulrich Thumm and Sweder van Wijnbergen are gratefuDy acknowledged.INTRODUCTION  AND BACKGROUND
Two years into the Economic  Transformation  Program, the Polish economy  is in a state of
deep crisis traceable largely to the SOE sector.  The euphoria  accompanying  the exceptionally
good performance in 1990  has vanished along with the factors that facilitated  it: once-off
inventory sales, the cushioning  effect of carried-over  dollar retention  accounts  and implicit
subsidies from CMEA trade.  The 1991 collapse  translated  into an immediate  fiscal deficit and led
to an increase in nonperforming  bank loans, a problem which now threatens to turn into a crisis,
while the linkage of inter firm arrears has raised the specter  of a generalized collapse. Enterprises
have reputedly failed to adjust, stalling growth and delaying  the "supply response", thereby calling
into question a fundamental  point of design in the ETP: that macro stringency alone would suffice
to press firms into spontaneous  adjustment  measures. Understanding  how macroeconomic  policy
has impacted  the behavior of enterprises is critically important  for the ongoing design of economic
policy in Poland.  This study has tried to illuminate  this "macro-micro"  linkage.
"Supply  response' does not necessarily connote  an immediate  jump to higher profitability
or output levels.  Given the initial conditions  of overstaffed  SOEs - socialist Poland had zero
unemployment  - and high energy and material intensity  owing to implicit input subsidies  from
CMEA trade, supply response could be expected  to include  resource re-allocation  through
bankruptcy, declining  output and employment  and even falling profitability. Therefore, this paper
concentrates on the behavior pattern of SOEs to gauge whether  there is movement  towards a
market economy in the sense of profit maximizing  behavior  and the enforcement  of hard budget
constraints by banks, crucial for resource re-allocation,  among  other issues. Data covering  the 21
months June 1989  - March 1991  drawn from a direct survey of 75 large SOEs are used to
illuminate  key aspects of enterprise behavior and performance:  (a) Was the sharp initial
contraction  of output due to enterprise monopoly  power? (b) What was the impact  of the demand
barrier and credit squeeze on the January 1990  output drop? (c) Did the fixed exchange  rate in
fact function as a nominal anchor for prices? (d) What role did banks play in resource  allocation?
Did they enforce the "hard budget" constraint?  (e) How did the wage setting process respond to
the incomes policy and tax on excess wages (PPWW)? Was there evidence  of decapitalization?  (f)
What accounted for the export boom in 1990, higher profitability  stemming  from the devaluation
of the zloty, or as claimed by enterprises, the domestic demand  barrier? (g) How has the tax
burden on enterprises  evolved over time?
SOE manufacturing,  the biggest subset of socialized  industry, accounted  in 1990  for some
30% of GDP, 19% of employment,  85% of exports and 60% of fiscal revenues. The sample
examined  here is from SOE manufacturing. Annex I describes  the sample, consisting  of 75 large
firms drawn mainly from the 1989 LISTA 500 (the largest Polish firms), using sales as the
criterion, and covering five manufacturing  sectors - metallurgy,  electromachinery,  chemicals,  light
manufacturing  (textiles, leather goods, garments) and food processing.
The included firms typically  employed 1500-6000  workers, though some exceeded  20,000,
and had annual sales of $ 100 million or more.  Products include  pipes, rails, metal  sheets, wire;
machine tools, transformers, electric engines, railway carriages, refrigerators,  bicycles; fertilizer,
plastics, organic and inorganic  chemicals; fabrics, clothes, hosiery, shoes  and leather  goods; meat
products, sugar, processed fruit, chocolate, cigarettes. At the time of the study, the vast majority
of the sampled firms were traditional state-owned  enterprises  with powerful workers  councils, two
(or more) trade unions and manage-s  legally subordinate  to the workers  council.  A handful  were
joint-stock companies with sole ownership of the state, resulting  in abolition  of workers councils
and freedom from the dividend  tax.  The enterprises were located  all over Poland, both in the big
industrial centers (Upper Silesia, Krakow, Warsaw, Wroclaw,  Poznan) and smaller cities (South-
East Poland, Szczecin, Torun, Bydgoszcz,  Radom, Piotrkow and many more).2
By and large, the output, profitability  and employment  trends of the sampled firms
conform to economy wide patterns obseived in aggregate  data.  However, the main contribution
of this paper is the examination  of the microeconomic  issues enumerated  above, which requires
firm-level information. In particular, the emphasis is on the behavior of large SOEs, on which
she fortunes of the state budget have critically rested.
While the focus on a non-random  sample  of l 1rge SOEs may seem constraining, it is in.
fact valuable  for the following  reasons: (a) these firms account  for a large part of economic
activity; (b) large SOEs embody  many of the more complex  adjustment  problems witnessed  in
transforming  the manufacturing  sector, partly because of their size, partly because of their
bargaining power; (c) there are obvious demonstration  effects associated  with large SOE behavior,
that will not only influence  the responses  of smaller SOEs, but also affect the credibility  of the
ETP.  Thus, if the government is seen as refusing to make arbitrary concessions  to large SOEs,
this will give smaller firms a clear signal that the new rules of the game are going to be enforced.
Lastly, it is probable that the variance  in behavior in the population  of large firms is low.
The sample findings on adjustment  are used in the concluding  section to suggest specific
ways in which the predominantly  macroeconomic  focus of the ETP can be complemented  by
suitable microeconomic  measures  to speed up attainment  of a market economy.
OUTPUT AND PROFIT RESPONSE  TO THE ETP
This section looks at output, profitability  and cost evolution  from late 1989 to the CMEA
shock in early 1991. Some of its main conclusions  are:
(i) The sharp contraction  in output at the start of the ETP can be explained  by standard
demand considerations  and partly by the reluctance  to borrow following  the huge jump in
interest rates, which led to a squeeze on working  capital that constrained  output.  There is
no evidence  from the sample  of the exploitation  of monopoly  power by firms.
Metallurgical  firms, which fit the common  perception  of being monopolistic,  actually
maintained  output in January despite falling profit margins. Electromachinery  firms cut
back output, but were heavily burdened  by cost increases  and rising interest costs.
(ii) A popular myth about SOEs is that interest rate increases  had no impact  because zloty
debt was wiped out by the hyperinflation  of end 1989. To the contrary, the high nominal
interest rates of first quarter 1990, which applied  to the entire stock of loans, old and new,
added a severe debt service burden for those firms having to rely on bank loans.
(iii) The latitude for using "cost plus constant mark up' pricing rules was quickly reduced
over 1990, suggesting  that while inflation  was initially  partly cost push, it was eventually
constrained by international  prices in conjunction  with the exchange  rate anchor.
(iv) Firms had not undertaken  serious cost cutting measures  over the survey period.
Evidence in support of the above is now presented.
Outut  trends
With the launching of the ETP, some decline in manufacturing  output (measured  in Polish
statistics by real sold production  or sales) was anticipated  because  of the intended  deflationary
impact of the stabilization  program. It was also felt that the drastic realignment  of relative prices3
would lead to some shrinkage  of heavy manufacturing  given its excessive  energy and material
intensity relative to international  levels.  What was surprising  was (a) the magnitude  and
.- nediacy of the drop, 19% in January 1990  and a further 15% in February, and (b) its
composition, with light manufacturing  and consumer  goods sectors declining  faster and earlier and
the heavier sectors following  suit only later.
Sample data mimic aggregate  Figure 1
manufacturing  trends: in the firms sampled,
real sales fell by 15% in January 1990  and  Real  Sales  Index
another 15% in February (Fig. 1 and Annex  Rea Sales  cmde
V), thereafter continuing  on a downward  (Dec  1989-100)  iok
course until July.  At the same time, finished  l  -
goods stocks grew, suggesting  some demand  i  '  oro-  i
resistance (Fig. 2 and Annex V).  Sectors that  Im|wt 
did relatively well in January 1990-  - I  l
metallurgy, chemicals  and food processing  - 0l
declined somewhat  faster upto mid-1990.
This initial stabilization  period (Fig. 1)  I  I  l
coincided with high savings rateF, vompletely  I  l
unanticipated  fiscal and trade surpluses  and  I  I
significant  erosion of real wages, reducing
aggregate domestic  demand. Sales picked up
between August and November,  coinciding  T/
with lower interest rates, increased consumer
spending and the simultaneous  using up of the
fiscal surplus and unutilized  margin under
wage indexation  from the first half of 1990  o  i  J  A  i  0  N  O  i  F  M
("macro  loosening", Fig. 1, which began to be  iih  1o0  I  1991  l
strongly reversed towards  end-1990 as  Based on Total Smple
inflation  picked up and the trade balance
worsened).  But output fell in December, in contrast to the year-end spurt to fulfil plan targets
associated with pre-ETP years and continued  to fall in first quarter 1991  with the collapse  of
CMEA trade.  This market loss effect was accompanied  by the elimination  of CMEA  subsidies  on
inputs and a big fall in real wages, indicating  a simultaneous  demand and supply shock.  The
electromachinery  sector in particular was hard hit owing to its energy and material intensity  plus
dependence  on CMEA markets.
Mirroring declining  sales, finished  goods stocks (as a percentage  of sales and in absolute
terms) displayed an erratic but upward trend, rising marginally  in January 1990  and then sharply
in February (Fig. 2 and Annex V).  There was a marked increase in first quarter 1991 following
the CMEA shock, especially  in electromachinery,  chemicals  and light manufacturing. Interviews
with managers indicated  that electromachinery  firms kept producing  hoping that the CMEA sales
impasse would be politicaliy  resolved; chemicals  firms found it increasingly  unprofitable  to export
following the squeeze  of margins resulting  from the combination  of dollarized  CMEA energy and
input prices and fixed exchange  rate; and the light sector (textiles  and leather) was unable  to sell
as a result of a severe deficiency  in marketing  skills and export barriers to the EC and other
prized markets.
The sample  data can be used to understand  better the sharp initial contraction  of output,
which has been variously  attributed  to exploitation  of monopoly  power (raise price, lower output);
liquidity squeeze owing to credit ceilings and high nominal interest rates; and inadequate  aggregate4
Figure 2
demand, the so-called "demand  barrier",
resulting from the sharp drop in real wages  Finished  Goods Stocks
and the erosion of real balances caused  by the  (Dec  198  St100)
hyperinflation  of 1989.  (Dec  1989  100)
January 1990 involved  a big increase  4o
in energy and transportation  prices and a  /
more than threefold increase in interest rates,
NBP's refinancing  rate jumping from a  A
monthly rate of 10.5% for December  to 36%
for January.  Firms reported being  charged
between  50% and 72% in working capital  260
interest for January for the entire stock of
loans,  not just  new borrowings.  Managers  20  /
reported a rush to repay zloty loans with  //
dollars from enterprise retention  accounts  in  1so
early January: for the sample, dollar deposits
fell from $ 110 million  at the end of 1989  to  100i  o
$54 million at the end ofJanuary, whilezloty  F  M A  J  A  a  0  IF
loans (working capital plus investment)  rose
in nominal terms only by 18% despite PPI  FimOooo8ae  4  R  . F,  m GoWe
inflation  of 110% for the month." Economy-  B"ed  an  Total Sample
wide, enterprise sector working capital  credits
fell in nominal terms from zloty 19.9 trillion at the end of December to zloty 19.4 trillion at the
end of January, indicating  reluctance  to borrow owing to the price of credit (interest rate), rather
than limited quantity ( binding credit ceiling). Standard  reasoning  would compare the rate of PPI
inflation  in January (110%) with the interest  rate (50-72%), conclude that real interest rates were
vastly negative, hence firms must have wanted  to borrow, hence the credit ceiling  must have been
the binding constraint.  However, this does not square with firm behavior, which led to the rapid
repayment  of zloty credits, indicating  that firms did not want to borrow and were responding to
the nominal interest rate.  It is noteworthy  that not a single manager complained  about liquidity  or
lack of credit in the early months  of the ETP; but the interest rate and demand barrier were
invariably  mentioned.
The conventional  view that only the real interest rate matters amounts  to saying that
managers compare the nominal interest  rate with inflation  and have an incentive  to borrow so long
as inflation exceeds  the interest rate.  However, managers' assertions that they looked at the
nominal interest rate is not naive when viewed  in the context of an individual  firm.  The crucial
point is whether a given firm finds it profitable  to borrow for working capital and produce at a
specific nominal interest rate, not how this interest rate compares with the inflation  in a general
price index (such as the PPI).  When  formalized,  this view suggests  that managers compare the
nominal interest rate with the profit margin  over variable costs: if output prices rise faster than
input  prices so that margins  are growing with inflation, it may pay a firm to 'invest'  in working
!Repayment of zloty credits in early January is (a) rational because by waiting for Jan.  1, enterprses  could extinguish
46% more zloty debt per dolar  than on Dec.  31 owing to the (anticipated) devaluation; and (b) is consistent with some
growth in zloty crdits  later in the month as the magnitude of operating cost increases became apparent.5
capital and borrow more.'  This also suggests  that a firm that can more easily mark-up price
over costs and pass through increased costs to the buyer is less likely to reduce output.  Box I
tests this view by reporting regression results based on 55 firms in the sample for which a
complete  data set was available.
Box I: Januara 1990 Outyu;  Declin
Model:
Jan. real  soals  =  f  Jan. mark up, interest/cost., Jan.),
Dec. real  sales  ( Dec. mark up  interest/costs,  DM..)
or in shorthand:
RSRATIO  =  f(MRATIO,  INTRATIO)
(+)  (-)
where  the expected  signs are shown  below the explanatory  variables: ability  to mark up and ?ass through  costs
(inelastic  demand, low demand  resistance)  would  encourage firms to produce  more;  while an increase  in the
share of interest in costs (low dollar deposits, greater dependence  on bank loans)  would discourage fims  from
borrowing  and producing'. Based on a log-log  specification,  the results  were (t-statistics  in parentheaes):
RSRATIO  = -0.0177 + 0.2089 MRATIO  -0.1465 INTRATIO
(-0.18)  (+4.10)  (-3.71)
Rbar sqd.=0.28,  S.E. of regression=0.32, F-stat=11.31.
Mm*  up ws cakuhW  as (p-tax  profit  - ml  cxzuordna  gas)Icom  of  asks,  to lim natc  d6e  effd  of ifltioasly  gais a  dol
de,osx in Dec. 1989,  dftchy  capturing  mai-up over  eods  o  the basic  bus  of Xe finn.
As Box 1 shows, both elasticity  of demand and interest burden were important in
explaining  January output decline. Since on average the interest share in costs grew by 23%
compared to an average reduction in mark up of 90%, demand constraints  were much more
significant  in explaining  the drop in output.
What about monopoly  power as an explanation  of the initial contraction in sales?
Metallurgical  firms, commonly  regarded as monopolistic,  maintained  sales and production in Jan.
1990 despite falling margins. Since there was no contraction  in output, monopoly  power as an
explanation  is irrelevant  for this set of firms.  Electromachinery  firms suffered a big decline in
sales; but were heavily burdened by cost increases  and rising interest costs.  The light sector
(textiles and leather), widely  regarded as non-monopolistic,  suffered reduced sales and rapidly
rising finished  goods stocks (Amnex  V).  Since the opportunity  cost of holding inventories (the
interest rate on working capital) was extraordinarily  high, one would have to conclude that the
stock accumulation  was involuntary  and that there was insufficient  demand for what was being
produced.
The regression results for January 1990 indicate  the predominance  of deficient demand in
explaining  shrinking sales, rather than supply-side  factors such as a credit squeeze. The behavior
of finished  goods inventories  (Fig. 2 and Annex V), which rose sharply and then declined  in the
2Annex  11  presnts this fonnally. In a steady  state, with all prices growing  at the same  rate, it may not be bad  to
comparm  the nominal  interest mte  with inflation;  but in a transition  from  a non-market  to a price-basod  economy  involving
drastic elative  price realignments,  such comparisons  could be misleading.6
second half of 1990 as demand picked up and fiscal and monetary policy were eased, also
suggests  demand problems: in all cases (except food processing, which is highly seasonal owing to
the concentration  of production activity in the second half of the year), inventories  at the end of
1990 were considerably  higher than at the end of 1989.  Managers universally  complai:ied  about
the demand barrier, but began complaining  about liquidity  only towards the end of the sample
period in mid-1991,  when slow sales and rising finished  goods stocks began blocking cash flow,
exacerbated  by the collapse of the CMEA market.  In stressing the gravity of the demand
problem, however, it must be pointed out that neither the regression results nor the managers'
assertions enable isolation  of supply  bottlenecks  stemn ng from product quality and obsolescence
problems. Further analysis is needed  of supply bottlenecks, beyond the scopt of the survey
results presented here.
Profit and Cost Dynamics
Macroeconomic  stringency and the nominal exchange rate anchor were designed  primarily
to halt inflation  at the start of the ETP, but were also seen as a source of adjustment  pressure on
SOEs.  Evidence  on shrinking profit margins and changing  cost structure presented  below attest to
several factors: (a) inflationary  gains on raw materials were beginning  to wear off as inventories
were depleted, firms typically following  historical, rather than inflation-based  cost accounting;  (b)
firms were increasingly  unable to follow 'cost plus constant  mark-up" pricing rules owing to the
fixed exchange rate and import competition;  (c) the exchange rate anchor was obviously beginning
to bite with the inflation  process approaching  what one would expect in a small, open economy  -
prices being constrained  by international  parities rather than being driven by cost-push  alone; (d)
firms under pressure to make ends meet were resorting to asset sales and leasing; (e) cost cutting
measures were not in strong evidence.
Underlying Profitability
Quarterly profit dynamics  are presented in Table 1, which captures  the ephemeral  nature
of 1990  profits.  Metallurgy  consistently  displayed the highest profitability,  until the first quarter
of 1991, when it was overtaken by food processing. Initially, profitability  in electromachinery
was comparable  to metallurgy; but it declined  much faster, reaching bankruptcy  levels by 1991:1
with the CMEA shock.  The chemicals  sector witnessed  a sharp decline in 1990:1,  and then
stabilized, collapsing  following  the dollarization  of CMEA energy and raw materials prices in
1991:1. The collapse of the light sector came much sooner, in 1990:11. This sector was subject to
immediate  price competition  from South East Asian and private, unrecorded  imports. In foreign
markets, this sector was handicapped  by barriers in the US, EC and EFTA markets. Marketing
expertise is also severely deficient, the combination  of factors leading to underlying  losses by
199  1:  I.
3Both  net extraordinary  gains, which behave erratically during hyperinfiation, and other income (subsidies; leasing and
asset sales) were excluded  in order to focus on underlying profitability, which nevertheless reflects inflationary gains on
stocks  in the last quarter of 1989 and to a smaller extent in the first quarter  of 1990.  To elminate the latter would require
information on accounting practice, quantity of inventories and historical purchase prices,  inforntaion  not easily  available.
However, these  effects  may be disrcgarded  after 1990:11.  See Glos3ary.7
Table  1. Quarterly  Trends in Underlying Proritability
Sector  1989:1V  1990:1  1990:11  1990:111  1990:1V  1991:1
Metallurgy  37.8  35.8  28.5  20.2  12.9  16.5
Electro.iachincry  34.7  20.9  18.8  23.1  17.5  2.2
Chemical  31.2  18.7  16.6  13.0  18.8  8.9
Light  36.7  19.7  8.9  6.7  4.1  -2.0
Food  18.2  16.3  22.4  23.2  22.4  18.2
e:  Underlying  profitability  is underlying  profit/net  sales %.  See Glossary.
Other Income
As Table 2 shows, other income (subsidies,  but ma:..  y asset leasing and sales) was
significant  in electromachinery  and light manufacturing,  helping to boost pre-tax profit in 1991:1.
For the other sectors, except food processing, the trend was less pronounced  or downwards.
Table  2. Other  Income  to Net Sales Percentage
Sector  1989:1V  1990:1  1990:11  1990:111  1990:1V  1991:1
MetaUurgy  3.3  0.6  0.2  0.5  0.4  1.3
Electromachinery  5.1  2.4  3.5  3.6  1.3  9.8
Chemical  5.7  5.4  3.5  3.8  2.2  2.2
Light  2.6  2.7  2.6  2.7  3.3  7.5
Food  3.1  1.6  1.3  2.5  0.8  5.8
Cost dynamics
Figs. 3-7 capture underlying  profitability  and cost trends by sector for materials and
energy, depreciation, interest and wage costs (wage bill x 1.65 to reflect taxes, social insurance,
etc.), as a share of net sales:
* the rapidly shrinking mark-up  over costs (the clear portion of the bar charts) attests  to
two facts: (a) firms were unable to follow "cost plus constant  mark-up"  pricing rules; and
(b) the exchange  rate anchor was obviously  beginning  to bite.  In short, the inflation
process was approaching  what would be expected in a small open economy, i.e., prices
being constrained  by international  price parity, rather than being driven by cost-push
alone.
* the squeeze on value added (crudely, net sales minus materials and energy costs, i.e.,
everything except the darkly shaded portion of the bar charts) and profit margins is
evident, indicating  that firms were caught between the fixed exchange  rate  and rising
costs, with no clear cost minimizing  responses  in evidence.
* the loss of implicit CMEA subsidies  is captured by the upward trend in materials  and
energy costs for the three "heavy"  sectors, metallurgy, chemicals  and electromachinery.8
* the rise in depreciation charges  Figure 3
following  revaluation  of assets by a  Costs  Structure
factor of 11 in January  1990 and 2.9  O  U
in January 1991 is evident from the  Metallurgy
pictures.
1.2
* interest burden grew significantly
for all sectors except metallurgy  1 -
despite capitalization  of interest.
0.8 
* wages suffered some compression  in
1990:1,  partly absorbing the shock  0.8  i
from higher materials and energy
costs and higher interest.  With value  OA  .
added collapsing, the share of wages
in value added grew rapidly,  0*2
especially in the labor-intensive  light  0* 
sector.
ivseo reo  irso  11ino I9Oo  rvi
e  although not depicted in the charts,
sales fell in first quarter 1991 over  sE  B  Dwr  E  Ioniert
last quarter  1990 in nominal  w  E  Other  O  it
terms for both electromachinery  and
light manufacturing  (-15% and 4.4%
respectively)  following  the collapse of CMEA trade.
Making use of the well-known  fact that there was considerable  slack in the exchange  rate
at the start of the ETP (the devaluation  having been 'excessive"), firms had more latitude in
marking up prices over costs initially, with this disappearing  as Polish prices reached international
levels. 4'  This reinforces the view that monopoly  price power may be a non-issue in Poland so
long as import competition  exists, and is captured by the example  of the FSO car company, which
in late 1990 was being asked by the Anti Monopoly Office  to roll back price increases,  but which
by early 1991 was in deep trouble owing to competition  from second hand car imports.
Enterprises may have undertaken  cost cutting measures  to preserve profits, but as the
results of this section have shown, their effect was not great.  ;his  may not be surprising: any
serious response to the change in input prices is going to involve significant  investment  to save on
energy consumption,  for example. The climate in SOEs and their horizon, which tends to be
short, is simply not conducive  to such effort and risk, a problem illustrated  by adverse selection  in
the banking  system - managers  of "good" firms, the obvious candidates  for restructuring
investments,  apparently  do not want to borrow and most of the loans are going to "bad" firms,
which are not likely to repay.  This issue is pursued below in the section on DEBT DYNAMICS,
with time horizon discussed in the section  on wage setting.
bDiscussions are contained in Pinto, Coricelli and de la Cafle (1990), Wellisz (1991) and Rodrik (1992).9
Figure 4  Figure 5
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DEBT DYNAMICS: BANK LOANS AND INTER FIRM CREDIT
While in any market economy  the banking  function  is crucial for efficient resource
allocation, there are also other checks  and balances  such as might be exercised by owners  and
other creditors.  In the Polish system of self-governed  SOEs with little or no oversight  function
performed by the founding  organs and ministries,  the role of banks is even more critical.  This
section contains  evidence  on what firms and banks actually  did, on the evolution of debt service
and the pattern of bank intermediation  in relation  to an important  sample of firms.  It also
discusses the record on enforcement  of bankruptcy  triggers such as non-payment  of dividends.
The key findings are:
(i) Reluctance  of profitable firms to borrow  means banks are going to be saddled  with
the worst enterprises. There is a clear adverse  selection  problem with loans going mainly
to firms in poor shape.
(ii) Enforcement  of bankruptcy  triggers has been lax and lacks credibility.
The evidence  pertaining to the above findings  is now presented.
Bank loans
Fig. 8 captures the big picture based  Figure 8
on the sample from the third quarter of 1989
to the first quarter of  1991.  It contains three  Bank Debt Dynamics
graphs.  The first, labeled "DebtBurd",
portrays  a measure of debt  burden (average  -00
bank debt divided by sales proceeds  minus all
non-financial  costs, or equivalently,  pre-tax
profit plus interest).  The advantage  of
focusing on the stock of debt rather than  ISO  b
actual interest paid is that this eliminates  any
bias caused by a reduction in interest due
through interest capitalization,  which was
widespread  over the sample period.  The
second graph, "Debt/CoS", captures
dependence  on banks for conducting
operations (bank debt / cost of sales, or bank  so
debt per unit of operating costs). The third
graph, "FG/Sal", is a demand indicator,
picking up ability to sell (finished  goods/sales  A  B  C  D  E
lir89  IV9S  ro  iro  iirao  iWoo  rin
Five phases may be distinguished  in
Fig. 8: (a) debt erosion as a result of the  DebtBurd  t  DebtICCo8 -*-  PGI
hyperinflation  of 1989; (b) cushioning  effect
of dollar deposits in first quarter 1990, when  debt burden stayed within moderate  levels despite
the big interest rate shock; (c) rising trends in all three indicators  over the first three quarters  of
1990, with a particularly sharp increase in the debt burden; (d) an improvement  in the fourth
sAverage debt is the averagc of monthly debt, defined as beginning plus end of month debt divided by two.  Finrs
reported the sum of investment and working capital credits.11
quarter of 1990 following  the slight  economic  recovery towards the end of the year; (e) the
CMEA shock, leading to a sharp rise in finished  goods stocks, yet a levelling  off in debt burden
and a slight decline in the debt/costs  ratio owing to the jump in costs and stringent  credit controls
in first quarter 1991.
To examine bank debt dynamics,  a pooled time series-cross  section regression was run for
50 firms on which complete  data were available  for the seven quarters 1989:III-1991:I  (350
observations). The idea was to obtain evidence  on what determined  the increase in bank debt
service burden: if loans were going to creditworthy  and profitable  enterprises,  one would not have
expected the trends portrayed in Fig. 8.  Box 2 summarizes  the regression results.
Box 2: Bank Debt Dynamics 1989:111  - 1991:1
The fbflowing specification was used (COSTS refer to costs of sales (materials,  energy,  labor,  interest.
averhcads),  NET PAYABLES to payables minus receivables on inter finn credit):
DEBT  =  f  NET PAYABLES, PRE-TAX PROFIT  + INTEREST,  FINISHED GOODS),
COSTS  COSTS  SALES  SALES
or  in short forrn:
DCOST  =  f(NPCOST,  P2ISAL, FGSAL).
The above specification is neither a demand nor supply function for credit,  only an attanpt  to find out what
variables the growth  in bank credits wcre the most strongly associated with.  The folowing  results were
obtained (t-statistics in parentheses):
DCOST  =  -0.0533 NPCOST - 0.3414 P21SAL + 0.3274  FGSAL
(-0.78;  (-3.77)  (+3.59)
Rbar  sqd. =0.48,  S.E.  of regression=0.27,  Autocorr.  of error=0.1S.
It can be seen from Box 2 that while net payables  has the right sign, (firms substitute  inter firm
for bank credit), it is statistically  insignificant. However, profitability  and finished  goods stocks
are significant  with signs indicating  a soft budget constraint. Essentially:  (a) either banks do not
lend to profitable  firms, or more likely, such firms are reluctant to borrow, preferring to rely on
their own surpluses; (b) debt is rising fastest  where firms are unable to sell, as captured by rising
finished goods stocks.  Moreover, the elasticity  of debt (at mean values) with respect to
profitability was - 0.24, while  that with respect to finished  goods stocks was + 0.09, indicating
that profitability was more significant.
These results signal  a serious adverse  selection  problem in the banking  system.
Obviously, any scheme for debt relief will have to be very competitive  and be linked to marketing
and business plans of firms.
The possibility  that good firms may not want to borrow squares with interviews: when
asked why Polish firms do not actively  seek low cost foreign credits (illustrated  by the sluggish
offtake of World Bank lines of credit) managers  expressed unwillingness  to assume additional
risks and cited: (a) the reluctance  of Polish banks and GOP to provide guarantees;  (b) exchange
risk; and (c) the strict requirements  of foreign  lenders, who usually require that consultants12
screened by them be hired for project evaluation. Often, the recommendations  of the consultants
are painful, e.g., drastic reduction in employment. The manager -Workers' Council - trade
union triangle does little to help the situation, with accountability  ill defined and managers not
willing to take chances  on loans and restructuring  programs when their own  jobs are insecure.
The lack of accountability  and incentive  is clearly a serious problem and is bound to impede
restructuring.
Inter firm Credit
The regression  results in Box 2 indicated  that to some extent, inter firm arrears are a
substitute for bank loans.  Normal payment  terms in Poland are two weeks after delivery.
Thereafter, interest is calculated  on the basis of a penalty rate, which is officially  determined  and
which far exceeds  the bank rate on working capital. However, firms are permitted  to legally
make side deals on payment  terms.  Inter firm credit has two further advantages:  payment
enforcement is much more difficult  than for banks, which can freeze accounts; and penalty interest
on inter firm arrears is tax-deductible.
Managers did not complain  of inadequate  bank credit, more that nominal interest rates
were too high.  This is particularly true of exporters, for whom ex post real interest rates were
extraordinarily  high owing to the fixed exchange  rate.  Managers indicated  a distinct preference
for suppliers' credits, revealing  that suppliers  tended to be understanding  about payment delays -
not surprising in view of slow sales!  Only towards the end of first quarter 1991  did the liquidity
crunch assume serious proportions, with the root cause  being slow sales, hence rising finished
goods stocks and cash flow problems.
Bankruptcy  triggers
At first, the only bankruptcy  trigger during the FTP was non-payment  of the dividend (a
misnomer for an asset tax levied on the share of the founding fund contributed  by the government
in total enterprise assets)  for three months. This was extended in September 1991 to cover any tax
arrears to the budget exceeding  three months. Contrary to expectations,  no bankruptcies
materialized  during 1990  and none of the enterprises  in the sample was under threat of bankruptcy
during the survey period.  However, some managers  candidly admitted that by western standards,
their firms would have been declared  bankrupt, even though Polish banks had no difficulty with
their credit standing. What happened beyond the survey period is not known. However, some
information  was obtained from the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOMT)  regarding restructuring
and liquidation  efforts. Based on this information,  described in Annex III, the will and capability
to enforce bankruptcy  is suspect.  The following  observations  may be made based on Annex Im:
(i) There is no early warning system.  Only when the enterprises are in obvious difficulty,
encountering  serious liquidity  problems, do they come to the attention  of the Ministry.
(ii) Banks appear to be slow in declaring  enterprises uncreditworthy,  the number of firms
regarded as being in difficulty  by MOIT far exceeding  those declared uncreditworthy  by
banks.  This points to a weakness  in the banking  system as well as to - possible softening
of the budget constraint, confirmed  by the econometric  evidence above.
(iii) Actual liquidations  on account  of poor financial condition have been negligible  so far,
only two to date.  Most liquidations  so far have been in connection  with privatization.13
(iv) Given the rapidly deteriorating  situation of enterprises, the period of three months of
nonpayment  of budgetary  dues before MOIT will consider restructuring  or liquidation  is
too long.
INCOMES POLICY AND FIRM-LEVEL  WAGE SETTING AND EMPLOYMENT
Incomes policy in the form of partial indexation  of wages to inflation  enforced by a
punitive excess wages tax (PPWW)  has been an integral and controversial  part of the ETP, with
the following  objectives:'  (a) inflation  control; (b) real wage reduction and control; (c)
efficiency, preventing decapitalization  and being a counterweight  to wage pressures, a proxy
"advocate  for capital".
Based on sample  evidence, the main findings were:
(i) SOEs tend to be myopic as indicated  by the willingness  to pay large sums as PPWW,
which could be used for restructuring and new product development;  and by the tendency
to use up surpluses  at year-end, showing willingness  to accept low initial wages but
expecting  compensation  as the size of the surplus becomes clearer.
(ii) There was a small but statistically  significant  credit-wage  link (more borrowing
translating into higher wages)  which could easily strengthen as enterprise profits decline.
(iii) There is reluctance  to fire workers and an apparent preference  for taking pay cuts
instead.  Managerial  perceptions are that employment  reduction has been insufficient  and
will speed up as commercialization  and privatization  pick up.
(iv) Wages are determined  by gross value added (disposable  surplus), banks credits and
the indexation  norm.  PPWW is treated as just another cost, to be borne if affordable.
(v) Decapitalization  was unimportant  in 1990, but became more apparent towards the end
of the sample period and could become more serious as time passes.
Evidence in support of the above conclusions  is now presented.
Wage setting
Based on economy-wide,  aggregate  data, real wages fell precipitously  in Jan. 1990, the
first month of the ETP.  Nominal wages barely moved  despite 80% inflation for the month. Two
competing  explanations  have been offered: (a) indexation:  the wage norm under indexation  was
binding; (b) liquidity  squeeze: nominal  wages were compressed  to accommodate  the nominal
interest rate shock as well as rises in the prices of energy and raw materials following  huge
administered  price increases in electricity,  gas and transportation.
Subsequently,  real wages remained  low, but grew rapidly in the second half of 1990.
Nominal wages exceeded  the cumulative  norm only in the fourth quarter of 1990, making  the
PPWW a significant  source of tax revenue. This development  is often attributed to the loosening
of credit policy and lower interest rates in the second half of 1990.
'Annex IV contains  a brief  description  of incomes  policy  during the ETP.  Mom details  nmy  be found in Blanchard
and Layard (1991).14
In 1991, real wages fell initially because most firms were in excess of the norm wage for
December 1990, which formed the basis for the Jan. 1991 wage norm.  Further, wages were
restrained by severe compression  of maigins following  the CMEA market collapse and
dollarization  of trade, which led to a large and abrupt decline in sales and a sharp rise in costs.
The evolution of firm-level wages
conforms to the general pattern observed in  Forecast  norm and wage  bill
aggregate data.  January 1990 wages were  January  1990
very close to the forecast wage norm (norm  J
based on forecast inflation  of 45% for  wa  bill
January, which was announced  in advance;
actual inflation turned out to be 80%) as Fig.
9 confirms. This suggests  that the forecast  2
norm was indeed binding; but must be
carefully interpreted. This is because
December 1989 wages were already close to  10
the forecast January norm, so that a wage
freeze in January motivated by the more than
three-fold jump in monthly nominal interest  .
rates and huge increase in energy prices could
be wrongly interpreted as a pull towards the
forecast norm.  In fact, the sample  o.6
information  shows that wages were more or
less frozen in January (reduction  of 2.2% for
sample) and were 95% of the forecast norm.  o
With the exception  of metallurgy, the other  Foet  no0r6  2 
sectors were all below the forecast norm.
Light manufacturing  recorded a 12% wage  Fhgure 9
increase, yet was 5% below the norm;
chemicals  had an 110%  wage cut bringing it 7% below the forecast  norm.  At the same time,
interest burden (share in costs) more than doubled in Jan. 1990  over Dec. across the board (with
the exception  of metallurgy), while wage cost share more than halved.
Managers variously attributed the Jan. 1990 wage restraint to the interest rate increase,
which led to a rush to repay zloty credits, reducing liquidity;  to the fear of bankruptcy and
willingness  of workers to "pay the price" for reform in support of "their own" (Solidarity)
government; time lag for workers to feel the pinch  of the real wage decline (somewhat  surprising
given 80% inflation  for the month); stringency  of wage indexation  norm; seasonal  decline of
January wages, being sandwiched  between high increases  in Dec. and prospective bonus payments
in February.
What about wages in subsequent months? Figs. 10-14  plot the graphs, by sector, of the
cumulative norm and wage payments  for 1990. Metallurgy  was always close to the norm and
exceeded it early, in March 1990. The gap between actual  and norm wages then progressively
widened. Food processing exceeded the norm around June and the gap then widened.
Electromachinery  and chemicals  conformed  to the pattern showing  up in aggregate  data, namely,
the norm was exceeded  only close to the last quarter.  Light manufacturing  was never close to the
norm except at the beginning  of 1990 and always below it thereafter, with the shortfall widening
over time.  The contrast between metallurgy (high) and light (low), which were at the two ends of
the profitability spectrum (Table 1 above), brings out the positive relation between profitability
and exceeding the norm; while the different time points at which the cumulative norm was15
exceeded (Figs. 10-14)  suggest  that both
Wage  and Wage  Norm  profitability and the relaxation  of credit and
Metallurgy  interest rate policy in the second half of 1990
played  a role.
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l  mo  l  subsidies  and the gradual hardening  of the
budget constraint, captured  by the inclusion  of
-w.  Wage  norm  value added.  Firms could be regarded  as
facing a two-step maximization  problem: in
Figure 10  the first step, value added is maximized;  in
the second, its distribution  among wages,
taxes (income, dividends, PPWW), investments,  retained earnings  and bonuses  is made.
Regressions  based on the above specification  using a sample of 65 firms yielded the
following conclusions  on wage evolution (details in Annex IV):
(i) The importance  of the wage norm in wage determination  steadily diminished  through
1990, while that of value added ("disposable  surplus") steadily grew.  This fits the story
that firms were initially  uncertain about what the ETP would bring, and were therefore
guided by the norm; but by the end of the fourth quarter of 1990, were anxious to
consume  the surplus available, as indicated  by a rise in the wage bill value added  elasticity
from 0.19 in the first quarter to 0.58 for the year as a whole.
(ii) There was a definite  and statistically  significant  credit-wage  link in the second  half of
1990, albeit weak, the elasticity  for the year as a whole being only 0.07.  Thus, the
relaxation of credit and lowering  of interest rates may have contributed  to the consumption
of the unutilized norm during the second half of 1990; but given the small size of the
elasticity, this would have probably taken place anyway.
(iii) First quarter 1991  displays a similar pattern to that in 1990, with starting monthly
wages having reached unsustainable  levels owing to the consumption  of the unused  norm
in the second half of 1990.16
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Employment
A major question in the response  of enterprises  to the ETP was whether  they would lay
off workers to reduce what was widely  regarded as significant  over employment. In fact, for the
economy  as a whole, employment  reduction  has considerably  lagged output decline, resulting  in
falling productivity and in some sectors, rising unit labor costs.
The evidence  from the sample of 75 firms conforms  to this aggregate  pattern.  The big
drop in output in 1990 was accompanied  by visible reduction in employment,  though on a smaller
scale, reducing productivity. Employment  reduction in 1990 ranged from a high of 17% in light
manufacturing  to 7-9% in metallurgy, chemicals  and electromachinery,  with food processing
showing little reduction. These variations can be linked to the financial  performance  of sectors
(good in food processing, poor in light at the other extreme), laWor  intensity (high in light) and
technology (many processes in metallurgy  and chemicals  have labor requirements  behaving  as a
step function).
Despite further output  drop in 1991, the decrease in employment  was modest, with
electromachinery  leading this time, showing  a decrease  of about 5% in 1991:1  as a result of losing
the Soviet market.
After an initial decline in unit labor costs stemming  from the big real wage drop in
January 1990, the trend was upwards. Light industry  particular was plagued by rising unit labor
costs despite shedding labor the most rapidly and having  the lowest wages, indicating  the depth of
the recession hitting this sector. In 1991:1,  unit labor costs increased  dramatically  for light and
electromachinery.
Managers indicated  that employment  reduction  has been mainly achieved  through
individual  departures and not replacing  retirees, i.e., through normal attrition.  Group layoffs
(which involve large severance costs) took place in 16 firms in the sample in 1990 and 16 firms in
1991  as well.  The first to go have been part-time  workers, recalled  retirees, those close to
retirement and undisciplined  workers. As a result, group layoffs have met little resistance so far;
but as the recession deepens  and further cuts are necessitated,  resistance might grow.  As expected
of worker controlled firms, labor sharing schemes  have arisen.  In 14 firms, the work week was
cut to 3-4 days at least once and in 32 firms, workers were obliged to use up their vacation time
during which they receive reduced wages. The highest incidence  of this has been in the
beleaguered light sector.
Regarding future prospects, the predominant  feeling among  managers  was that
employment  would fall over the next 2-3 years and that privatization  would lead to an acceleration
in unemployment.
Effectiveness  of Wage Policy
Inflation Control
This is clearly a macroeconomic  issue and is therefore dealt with only in passing. In
retrospect, the effectiveness  of wage policy in containing  inflation  has been suspect.  Although  the
ETP is commonly described as having  two nominal  anchors, the exchange  rate and nominal
wages, in fact the nominal wage path has been completely  endogenous,  being dependent  upon the
price path.  In principle, owing to the endogeneity  of wages, only the exchange  rate could have18
functioned as an anchor, the expectacion  probably  having  been that domestic prices would quickly
converge to international  prices, thereby leading to convergence  of nominal wages. The initial
slack in the exchange  rate in 1990, high (monthly)  frequency  of wage adjustment  and ability to
accumulate  the unused wage margin under indexation  upset such calculations  in the second half of
1990, resulting in a wage-price  spiral.
Moreover, fiscal imbalance  was not an issue in 1990, unlike 1991  and 1992. Under this
circumstance, wage indexation  (together  with that of social  money benefits) could create strong
inflation inertia and dilute attempts  to contain inflation.
Norm and Actual Real Wages Under Indexation
The starting norm wage bill for the ETP was obtained by taking the Sept. 1989  wage bill
and adjusting it by a factor of 0.8 for fourth quarter 1989  inflation. With a factor of 0.3 to be
applied to forecast Jan. 1990 inflation  of 45%, this alone meant (assuming unchanged
employment) a real wage reduction  of 32% by Jan. 1990,  the first month of the ETP.  Table 3 is
based on the sample: (a) on average, by Dec. 1990, the norm real wage fell by 50%; (b) the
actual real wage exceeded  norm wages by 32% in Dec. 1990, but representing  nevertheless  a
substantial decline of 34% relative to Sept. 1989; (c) by March 1991, actual and norm real wages
were on average closer to each other, with the Dec. 1990  gap significantly  reduced.
Table 3. Actual and Norm Real Wages (Sept. 1989 = 100)
December 1990  March 1991
.____________  Actual  Norm  Actual  Norm
Metallurgy  68.0  48.7  55.8  46.0
Electromachinery  65.3  51.0  49.7  47.5
Chemical  68.8  48.7  50.6  46.7
Light  48.5  47.5  41.3  44.4
Food  78.9  55.9  64.3  55.9
Total sample  65.9  49.8  51.9  47.2
It is tempting to believe  that the extent of real wage reduction  portrayed in Table 1 was
unanticipated  by the designers  of the ETP.  The scenario  probably  assumed was one where the
fixed exchange rate would quickly lead to a convergence  of the price level, hence of nominal and
real wages.  Assuming  real wages should bear some relationship  to productivity, it is difficult  to
believe that a 50% decline in productivity  was anticipated  between  Sept. 1989 and Dec. 1990.
However, a self-fulfilling  prophecy could result if the reduction  in real wages reduces  aggregate
demand, hence capacity  utilization  and productivity,  as happened  in Poland in 1990.
PPWW, Decapitalization and Dividends
PPWW payments  exploded  in the fourth quarter of 1990. As presaged by Figs. 10-14,
there was strong correlation  between  profitability (metallurgy  at the 'high" extreme, light
manufacturing  at the "low") and incurring the PPWW.19
Despite exceeding  the norm, there was little evidence  of decapitalization  in 1990: as Table
4 asserts, the burden of PPWW on disposable  cash was only 10% in 1990. Further, investments
comfortably  exceeded  depreciation  for the two sectors, metallurgy  and food processing, which had
the highest PPWW payments. The only exception  was light industry, also the least profitable.
However, this sector had the highest burden of dividends,  the tax levied on founder's capital, as
Table 4 shows.  The light sector is remarkable,  exhibiting  cautious  wage behavior, yet not fully
replacing  depreciation with new investments. Rather than use retained earnings  for restructuring,
most of these went for dividend  payments, reflecting  the inefficient (and inequitable)  nature of this
tax, which bears no relation to profitability.
Sectoral dispersion in the PPWW/disposable  cash burden grew in 1991:1. The increases
were particularly sharp for electromachinery  and chemicals, both of which were deeply affected
by the loss of the Soviet export market (electromachinery  especially)  and dollarization  of CMEA
prices.  The range increased  from 0%-38% in 1990  to 0%-73% in 1991 with two firms, both in
chemicals, exceeding  disposable  cash.
Some evidence  that enterprises  are myopic is provided by the high level of average
PPWW payments in dollars, especially  significant  for metallurgy  and chemicals, both of which
will need considerable  investment  for restructuring  to lower energy consumption,  improve
technology and control pollution.  It is unlikely  that in a private, market economy such payments
would be tolerated.
The last two columns  contain a "catch-all"  measure  of decapitalization  based on the claims
on profit II or income before tax.  These claims are income  tax, dividend and PPWW. If the sum
of these claims exceeds profit II, then the payment must cut into the depreciation  allowance  and
reduce the resources available for investment  and maintenance  of existing plant and equipment.
According  to this measure, decapitalization  occurred in light manufacturing  and possibly,
chemicals, in view of its capital intensity, in first quarter 1991. However, it was not an issue for
the other sectors over the survey period.
Table  4. Some Indicators of Decapitalization
PPWW/Disposable  Dividend/Net  1990  IT+DT+PPWW
Cash (%)  Income (%)  /Profit II (%)
Investments/  PPWW
Depreciation  per
1990  1991:1  1990  1991:1  (%)  Enterprise  1990  1991:1
_______  _______  ~~~~~~~~~($  inn)_  _  _  _
Met.  13.09  11.02  10.96  17.51  166.6  4.200  52.4  57.5
Elec.  5.13  13.13  7.66  21.72  112.9  0.700  46.1  66.2
Chem.  9.35  18.25  22.19  58.35  114.7  1.690  56.7  94.3
Light  0.31  0.22  44.11  257.86  79.4  0.004  75.6  141.9
Food  13.71  14.46  2.43  2.10  192.6  1.331  47.4  50.6
Tot.  10.46  13.47  12.67  23.61  132.5  1.598  52.2  65.5
SNtQs:  (1) Disposable cash is Profit II-Income  Tax-Dividend+Depreciation.
(2) Net Income is Profit II-Income  Tax.20
Wages and Value Added
Although  the evidence  does not support the idea that workers are determined  to raise
wages at all costs, this could change as profitability  declines.  Given the continuous  decline of the
norm real wage so long as inflation  persists, workers may feel justified in raising real wages
above the norm and paying  the PPWW (or incurring  arrears) even if it means severely
diminishing retained earnings. Out-of-sample  behavior  partly supports this view, with real wages
rising strongly from July 1991  onwards despite the sharp fall in profitability  and perhaps
facilitated  by the devaluation  of May 1991, when the exchange rate anchor was relaxed for the
first time since the start of the ETP.
Figs. 3-7 show that the share of wages in gross value-added  increased alarmingly  after
falling in first quarter 1990.7' This upward trend is disturbing, capturing the fact that worker
controlled  SOEs have no particular incentive  to maximize  gross value added through cost
minimization,  product mix change or restructuring;  but have full control on how it is disposed  of.
HARD CURRENCY EXPORT  PERFORMANCE"
Without doubt, the 40% rise in the volume of hard currency exports in 1990  was one of
the stellar early achievements  of the ETP.  At the economy-wide  level, two manufacturing  sectors
in particular, metallurgy  and chemicals,  displayed considerable  export dynamism.
Why did hard currency exports increase so rapidly? Three basic hypotheses  have been
advanced:  (a) the 46% devaluation  of the zloty at the start of the ETP increased export
profitability  and hence, exports rose; (b) the export boom occurred mainly because firms
attempted  to offset declining  domestic sales ("demand  barrier") with higher sales abroad; (c) the
increase in exports was a one-time  structural shift in geographical  composition  following  trade
liberalization.
Drawing on the 10 metallurgy  and 12 chemical firms in the sample (for which a complete
data set was available and which accounted  for a significant  22% and 33% of the respective
economy-wide  sector exports in 1990), this section  traces changes in export profitability  from the
third quarter of 1989  to the first quarter of 1991. The increase in exports coincided  with
diminishing  profits relative to domestic  sales, suggesting  that both the domestic demand barrier
and a possible structural shift (hypotheses  (b) and (c) above)  played a role in the export boom.
The main findings of this section are:
(i) Exports rose in 1990 despite a falling profit differential with domestic sales.
Surprisingly, this differential was the highest in the fourth quarter of 1989, rather than in
the first months of the ETP, as one may have suspected.
71n  Figs.3-7,  gross value-added is everything excluding the darkly s'uaded  portion of the bar chart (roughly, net sales
minus mnaterials  and energy costs).
'This section focuses exclusively on convertible (hard) curncy  exports and iiaores tmnsferable rmble  exports.21
(ii) By the fourth quarter of 1990, 5 out of the 10 metallurgical  firms and I out of the 12
chemical  firms were making losses on exports. these numbers increasing  to a staggering  8
and 5 respectively  by the first quarter of 199i.
(iii) The average ratio of export to domestic sales peaked towards mid-1990, with a
perceptible  decline thereafter.  While the initial  boom was in response  to weak dor estic
demand rather than higher profitability, as profitability  fell and losses were incurred, firms
restrained their export activity. The reason is that it pays firms to expand exports so long
as the export  price covers variable  costs, even if export sales are less profitable  than
domestic salg.  However, the moment losses are made on exports, one may expect
reduced activity.
These findings suggest that the squeeze  on export profitability as the result of export
prices rising much more slowly than costs (at a macro level, the real appreciation  of the zloty)
will eventually  lead to falling exports.  One way of stimulating  exports is through a much more
aggressive  exchange rate policy.  However, this will work only if the increased enterprise
surpluses  following a devaluation  are used for investment  in energy and materials  saving
technology, thereby lowering  variable costs.  If, however, higher prices feed into higher wages,
the effect will be neutralized. The evidence  above showed that wages increase strongly with
enterprise surpluses, and that the share of wages in value-added  has been  growing rapidly.
Therefore, a more aggressive  exchange rate policy will be effective  only when combined  with a
counterbalance  to wage pressures at the firm-level, and managerial  compensation  mechanisms  that
will lengthen  the decision-making  horizon of firms, discussed further below.
Real Exchange Rate, Export Profitability  and Volume
Fig. 15 plots the real exchange rate  Figure 15
(Polish CPI divided by trade-weighted,
exchange rate adjusted  trading partners' WPI)
from June 1989  to June 1991. In January  RER  and WRER
1990, popular belief notwithstanding,  the  Januuy  1990  100
large nominal devaluation  was accompanied
by little or no real depreciation;  in fact there  260
was a small real appreciation  when the RER
is calculated  at a weighted  average of the free
(20%) and official (80%) exchange  rates to  00
reflect enterprise dollar retention  accounts in
1989, shown as WRER in Fig. 15.
Thereafter, the real exchange  rate steadily
appreciated. Yet, hard currency exports
increased 40% in volume in 1990 at the same
time that real sales (industrial  output) plunged
23%.  t  /
The upper panel of Table 5 gives the
difference between  export and domestic  J6nAug0  tlx  JuAuXti  Ire
profitability (p,,-p,),  while the lower panel  Jun  AoOcto  b AorJun  AgotO  Feb  rJu
gives the ratio of export  to domestic sales
from the third quarter of 1989  to the first  -REER  - WREER
quarter of 1991 for the 10 metallurgy  and 1222
chemical  firms referred  to earlier.'  Focusing  on the profitability  differential,  p.-p,, (a)
automatically  eliminates  any bias in favor of exports resulting  from inflationary  gains on
inventories  as these would  apply  equally  to domestic  sales, and (b) similarly,  while  both
metallurgy  and chemicals  were beneficiaries  of implicit  CMEA  subsidies  on energy  and raw
materials,  this would not necessarily  create  a bias in favor of exports  over domestic  sales.
Table  S. Tzends  in Export  Profitability  and Volumes.
1989:11F  1989:1V  1 1990:1  1990:11  1990:111  11990:V  1991:1
Export  Profitability-Domestic  Sales  Profitability  (% pts)
Metallurgy  6.8  11.9  -9.5  .14.6  -10.3  _  .8.0  _  23.9
Cbemical  31.2  34.7  13.4  5.0  3.2  0.2  -37.6
Ratio  of Export  to Domestic  Sales (%)
Metallurgy  15.9  19.6  17.0  26.2  29.8  22.8  13.6
Chemical  26  .8  35.7  48.8  76.8  64.8  67  .5  45.5
The numbers  in Table 5 are remarkable  and confirm  the suspicions  generated  by the real
exchange  rate graph: (a) export  sales were more profitable  in late 1989  than at any other point
over the sample;  (b) the profit difference  with domestic  sales fell steadily  (chemicals)  and
erratically  (metallurgy),  with an abrupt  drop in 1991:1,  suggesting  that while  domestic  prices
could  be adjusted  to compensate  for the dollarization  of CMEA  inputs,  export  prices  were
constrained  by the nominal  exchange  rate anchor;  (c) export  sales as a ratio of domestic  sales took
off in 1990,  partly because  domestic  sales were falling,  but were distinctly  weakening  by late
1990.
The coincidence  of rising export  volumes  with declining  profitability  is clear from Table
5. Regression results based on the 22 firms in this sub-sample (10 metallurgy, 12 chemicals) over
the 7 quarters 1989:M-1991:1, are reported in Box 3.
Box  3: Export  Boom.  1989:111  - 1991:1
The  regression  was based  on the following  specification:
X/D = fp.-p,, DD),
where  the  left hand  side  variable  is the ratio  of export  to domestic  saes and  the  explanatory  variables  *rc  the
profit  differential  and  an indicator  of economy-wide  sector  domestic  demand  (DD, or domestic  sales  dchlated
by  the sectoral  PPI). The foUowing  results  were  obtained  (t-statistics  in pareatbesi*
XID = 0.1873 (p.-pJ  - 0.00052  DD
(1.18)  (-2.01)
Rbar  sqd.  =0.52, S.E. of regression-0.61,  Autocorr.  of error0.34.
9Firm-  reported  the export  P&L  account  sparately,  which  enabled  the  calculation  of export  profitability.  However,
variable  cost  were not sepately identified. Since export  cost  were given sepamtely,  the rtio of export  to domesti
sales  by volume  was  approximated  by  the ratio  of the repective  cosu, eliminating  the  need  for  firm-level  price  deflatorc.23
Both variables in the specified regression (Box 3) have the expected  sign; however, the
coefficient  on the profit differential is not significant  at conventional  levels, while that on domestic
demand is.  This result reinforces the view that the export boom of 1990 was largely stimulated
by weak domestic demand.  This does not mean that exports will not respond to increased
profitability;  only that such profitability  did not increase  in 1990  and therefore could not have
been a factor in explaining  the export boom.
EVOLVING  TAX BURDEN
The dependence  of the budget, and hence the stabilization  program, on the performance  of
the SOE manufacturing  sector was underlined  by the collapse  of tax revenues following  the
CMEA shock in the first quarter of 1991. Any discussion  of tax reform, or indeed of optimal
taxation, is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. The intention  is only to make a few general
observations  based on sample evidence:
(i) The tax burden per unit of sales fell, but rose per unit of value-added.
(ii) The share of PPWW and dividends  in total taxes increased  from 16% in the second
half of 1989 to 23% in the first quarter of 1991.
Fig. 16, based on the whole sample, depicts tax burden (turnover  tax +  income  tax +
dividends + PPWW - subsidies) as a percentage  of sales and gross value added (crudely
approximated  by pre-tax profit + wage costs + depreciation). The difference  in the tr-id should
not come as a surprise owing to the erosion of value-added  over the sample period.
Fig. 17 shows the changing  structure  of taxes, principally,  a reduction in income tax and
increases in the others.  The growing share of dividends  and PPWW is cause for concern  because
these payments  are made from after-tax  profits and are therefore predicated  on profitability  of
firms.  As profitability  declines, so may the ability to collect  these taxes.
Figure  16  Figure 17
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Real Exchange Rate. Wages and the Budget
The information  on taxes combined  with the earlier observations  of falling export
profitability, real appreciation  of the zloty and short-run wage pressures  presents a dilemma in
relation to nominal exchange rate anchor-based  stabilization  programs. The success of such
programs depends crucially  on the speed and quality of the microeconomic  response  elicited.  If
this response does not materialize, then given the close dependence  of the budget  on SOEs, a
fiscal imbalance  could emerge that ends up threatening  stabilization. This in turn might call for a
relaxation of exchange  rate policy to take the pressure off enterprises. This has been the case in
Poland, and it points to the importance  of paying attention  early on, perhaps at the very start of
the program to: (a) SOE incentives  and governance;  (b) reform of the banking  system to steer
resources in the needed  direction; (c) and tax reform, all of which reduce dependence  on the
exchange rate as an instrument  of change. To large extent, these issues  were neglected in the
early part of the ETP because  the fleeting  nature of the good results in 1990  was not recognized
and this in part led to a significant  underestimation  of the size of the CMEA shock in 1991.
A possible response  is to change course and adopt  a more flexible  and aggressive
exchange rate policy; but as repeatedly  cautioned  above, this will bear fruit only when combined
with a counterbalance  to wage pressures  and incentives  to lengthen  the decision-making  time
horizon of firms.
QUALITA  fIVE CHANGES  IN FIRMS
The ETP involved  moving overnight  from a systerm  of bargaining  with central authorities
about subsidies, special allocations  of raw materials and central investments  to one emphasizing
macroeconomic  stringency  and price and trade liberalization. There were two basic changes for
firms: (a) the emphasis  shifted from production,  the staple of the old shortage  economy, to profits
and marketing; (b) firms were increasingly  unable to follow cost plus constant  mark up pricing
rules.  This section focuses  on the _ualitative  changes  introduced  as a result  of the new economic
regime.  It is based largely on manager interviews  and responses  to the qualitative  part of the
questionnaire.
Organization  Structure
Three forms of change were seen: splitting up of big SOEs; creating  partnerships;  and
internal change.
From early 1990, in 20 SOEs in the sample, some units were spontaneously  separated and
transformed into independent  SOEs (metallurgy  2, electromachinery  5, chemicals  3, light 5, foed
5).  In addition, 10 enterprises  in the sample were already the product  of deconcentration  carried
out (from above) in 1990  in meat and sugar production. Of the 20 where spontaneous
deconcentration  took place, 21 new units were created on the basis of distance of location  from
the main plant.  Other criteria have included  products not integrally  connected  with the main
activity and units that were performing  worse than average. Sometimes,  managers  of separated
subunits had different ideas  about the prospects and management  of the units, this serving as the
basis for separation.
A second form of change  has involved  creating partnerships  and joint ventures  to market
the product or render auxiliary  services (transportation,  repair).  Some of these partnerships  were
created in the late 1980s  and are being  dissolved because  they are controlled  by the former senior
managers of the firms and are therefore perceived as 'nomenklatura hideouts". The new ones are25
created jointly with Polish and foreign  private capital with the objectives  of marketing  and
promoting sales domestically  and abroad, including  packaging the product; and provision  of
auxiliary services.
The third and perhaps most important  change  has been the shift in emphasis  from
production to marketing. Formerly, the number  two in the firm was the deputy  director in charge
of production and technology. Now as an overwhelming  rule, the number two position  is given to
the deputy in charge of either financial  management  or sales.  There is also a general move to
strengthen marketing, sales and customer  service  departments,  and creation of export  departments
to reduce dependence  on Foreign Trade Companies,  who are responding by lowering their
commissions.  Another change at the top is a frequent merging of economics  and accounting
functions.  Nevertheless, marketing  remains  weak and good accountants  are hard to find, with
many firms reporting vacant positions  and trained accountants  lured away to private sector  jobs.
Much of the initiative  for change  comes  from the new marketing  and finance people, not
the production and technology  people. An important  trend is the move to create product-based
profit centers both to highlight  the importance  of product mix selection  and impress upon the
production staff the need to be able to sell what is produced.
In all S commercialized  enterprises  in the sample, the momentum  for change was tangible,
with commercialization  seen as a good  occasion  for reorganization  and streamlining.
Disposal of Redundant  Assets
Out of 75 firms, 22 reported  selling or leasing  part of their productive  assets, most
frequently in electromachinery  and light but rarely in the other sectors (recall  Table 2 above).
The share of total productive assets involved  was small, between 1% and 5% and never exceeding
10%.  The assets include means of transport  (trucks, buses) small machinery  and small self-
contained  production units, although  disposal of the latter is limited; and buildings  and office
space.  The limited scale of selling/leasing  was attributed  to: (a) presumption  that demand  will
pick up; (b) fear on the part of managers  that such action could lead to accusations  of conflict  of
interest and hidden payoffs as such deals are usually  concluded with the private sector; (c) asset
revaluation as a result of inflation,  leading  to book values in excess of market values and
reluctance to sell at a book loss.  Whereas  machinery  and transport equipment  were often sold,
buildings were usually rented as office space  or warehouses,  not for production  facilities.
The tendency to dispose of non-production  related assets (health centers, holiday  resorts,
cafeterias, worker housing)  was much  stronger. Worker housing in particular represents  a serious
burden as such housing is not under the umbrella  of state subsidies  and workers pay rents
comparable to or lower than those living in subsidized,  cooperative  housing. As a fraction of
profits, such costs could  be large.  One example  is provided by a firm owning 3000 flats
involving monthly maintenance  costs of about $ 100  per flat per month. Many firms are anxious
to get rid of worker housing, cafeterias  and day care centers, but find no takers as municipal
authorities do not have the means  to maintain  these even when the facilities  are offered free.
Although no more than 10% of total non-production  assets were reported to have been sold or
leased so far, this number  being only rarely exceeded,  the tendency is growing perceptibly.
Getting rid of self-contained  production  units and most of the non-production  assets is d
fast way of making enterprises leaner and more efficient;  however, managers  reported that
processing and overcoming  legal obstacles  are time consuming.26
Links with Customers and Suppliers
Until 1989, these links were largely centrally controlled  through rationing, obligatory
distribution through specified channels  or else dictated  by limited choice.  Following  the collapse
of the former state-owned  distribution  channels, there are two moves afoot: first, to link up with
new private wholesale  traders and retailers; and second, to build up own sales and purchasing
networks. Many firms have become  aware of the importance  of factory outlets and shops, which
are seen as crucial in the present (mid-1991)  liquidity-constrained  environment.
Exports are viewed as essential  for survival in view of the shrinking domestic market and
the need for expanding  sales in the presence  of fixed costs.  Polish firms are now keen on finding
solid western partners who will help to upgrade the product and market it abroad.  There is a new
slogan: 'To survive, we must export."
On the inputs side, there have been clear moves to switch suppliers based on cost, quality,
terms of payment and reliability  of delivery.  In many instances, there has been a switch to
western imports both from domestic  suppliers and the former CMEA sources.  The growing
awareness  of import price competition  is illustrated  by the remarks  of some managers in the steel
sector, who were consciously  keeping  their prices a little below the cif cost of imports. More
and more, customer  relations are being strengthened  with many upstream  enterprises even
anticipating  the requirements  of their downstream  counterparts, a far cry from the situation  just a
few months ago.  Table 6 summarizes  the responses  of managers in this regard.27
Table 6.  Reasons Indudng  Firms to Change Suppliers
Change of Suppliers
Reason For Change  Domestic  to Foreign  Foreign to Domestic |  Domestic  to other  |  Foreign to Other
Domestic  j  Foreign
Number of Firms (out of 75)
1. Higher quality  25  1  22  13
2. Lower prices  26  14  42  20
3. Reliability  of  18  3  15  7
deliveries
4. Better service  2  2  2
5.  Lower costs of  I  10  12  1
transportation
6. Possibility  of  IS  10  23  17
delaying payments
Links with Foreign Partners
Motivated  by domestic  recession, deepening  financial and marketing  problems and a
distinct technological  gap, SOEs have begun looking  to a foreign  joint venture partner as an
instant solution. Of the firms in the sample, 68% reported long-lasting  cooperation  with foreign
partners, 12% were in the process of establishing  cooperation  and 20% did not have any links
with foreign partners. The least interest was expressed by food processing (meat and sugar
production) owing to their comfortable  position  on the internal market.
Ties with foreign  partners have traditionally  taken the form of export-import,  buying
machinery and licensing  of production, now considered  insufficient. Solid partners are sought  to
start more extensive  ties involving  capital investment,  introduction  of modern  technology and
organization, and sales (Table 7 summarizes  hopes and expectations  of the firms).  The managers
feel that to elicit commitment,  foreign partners must be given part ownership.
Nearly all the firms in the sample were visited by several potential investors. After
preliminary contacts, however, the foreign partners either withdrew or decided to wait.  Managers
attribute the lack of enthusiasm  of foreign partners to: (a) a desire to merely obtain competitive
information  from them; (b) the hope that as the situation  deteriorates, Polish firms will become
cheaper to buy out; (c) waiting  for commercialization  or privatization  as a prerequisite.'@0
Polish firms see their attractions  as follows: (a) well-qualified  and relatively cheap labor
force (mentioned  in all sectors); (b) unutilized  productive  facility that is fairly modern (metallurgy
and electromachinery;  food processing  having no unutilized  capacity); (c) access to a large
t is cleady important  to ascetain the point-of-view  of potential  foreign  partne,  in particular  what
impediments/opportunities  they see at the finn level; and what impediments  are represented  by the legal/regulatory
frmework.28
national market with potential future access  to the Soviet market; and (d), stressed in chemicals,
less stringent pollution control than in the West."'
Table 7. What Polish Firms expect from Foreign Partners
Answers in %
Total  Metallurgy  Elec.  Chemical  Light  Food
1. Inflow  of financial  27.4  30.0  27.8  29.5  32.6  15.8
mcans
2. Inflow of modern  19.8  21.3  7.6  17.6  16.8  3C.8
machinery&equipment
3. Access to modem  21.3  28.8  24.0  24.7  13.5  15.8
technology  .
4. Licenses  3.9  2.5  8.9  3.S  - 5.3
S. Introduction  of modem  5.7  1.2  7.6  5.9  6.7  7.9
organizational  solutions
6. Introduction  of modern  2.4  1.2  2.5  1.2  - 7.9
informational techniques
7. Help in sales abroad  16.5  10.0  21.6  14.1  27.0  7.9
8. Improving  qualifications  3.0  5.0  - 3.5.  3.4  7.6
of personnel  I_  I  __  __.
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Role of Managers
In the judgment of the team conducting  this enterprise survey, managers  are by far the
dynamo for change within SOEs, workers  playing more of a reactive, ratifying role.  The picture
that emerges of Polish SOEs is one of tension  between managers and the Workers' Council, which
manifests itself in three basic ways: emphasis  on profits and marketing;  slow adjustment  of labor
force relative to output drop; huge flexibility  in real wages and more recently, downward
flexibility even in nominal wages with workers willing to tighten the belt when necessary  but
expecting  immediate  compensation  whenever  the situation improves. Although  the ideas for
change originate largely from managers,  they are legally subordinate  to the Workers' Council,
lack job security and do not have sufficient  financial incentive to undertake the gigantic  task of
restructuring.  To make matters worse, few managers have received  any degree of formal training
in modern management  and marketing;  and in any event, lack operating experience  in a market
system.  There is need for a big investment  in human capital, which must be treated  as a public
investment  problem because the private sector will never have the incentive  to impart training on
the massive  scale (some 100,000  managers)  required because training is costly and managers  can
be lured away by other firms ("free rider" problem).
In short, (a) accountability  and authority  at the firm-level are vague. At the moment,
neither principal nor agent is clearly defined; (b) firm-level incentives  in terms of managerial  job
"Although  one would  expect  that this will  change,  Polish  environmental  standards  in many  cases  exceeding  thosw  in
the EC.29
security and profit-linked  compensation  are virtually absent; (c) there is need for training in
marketing and finance on a large scale.
CONCLUDING  REMARKS: MICROECONOMICS  OF TRANSFORMATION
There is a natural temptation to measure adjustment  exclusively  by the financial  bottom
line, from which one would conclude that adjustment  during the ETP has been dismal: the lack of
effort during 1990 was masked  by inflationary  gains on inventories  and the cushioning  effects of
enterprise dollar deposits and CMEA trade protocols. As evident from Figs. 3-7, margins  have
been shrinking and value added has declined  steadily and then abruptly following  the dollarization
of CMEA trade.
There have been other worrying signs: labor shedding has been slow, leading to a rising
share of wages in value added, with no apparent incentive  to maximize  the latter.  Far from
serving as an advocate  of capital, the excess wage tax has functioned  strictly as a penalty, being
treated by firms as just another cost to be borne if affordable. The myopia  of firms is confirmed
not only by the willingness  to pay large sums as the PPWW with no obvious attempts to maximize
value added, but also by the virtual absence  of long-term  restructuring  plans.
This absence  finds its echo in the apparent unwillingness  of "good' firms to borrow for
restructuring  and in the deficient role of banks, whose loans appear to be going to the least
profitable firms saddled  with rising finished  goods stocks. This combination  of the banks
seemingly  unable to influence  resource allocation in the direction pointed by the market, and the
absence  of incentive  on the part of good firms and their managers  to assume additional
responsibility, is a serious bottleneck to adjustment.
At the firm-level, the softening of the budget  constraint in the guise of bank loans and at
the more aggregate  level, the unwillingness  or inability  to enforce bankruptcy  triggers is bound to
affect the credibility of the ETP and the incentive  for deep restructuring  involving  energy savings,
new products and markets and additional  employment  cuts.
The above summary  of findings from the sample points to an important  conclusion:  that
macroeconomic  stringency and price liberalization,  while necessary, are insufficient  to induce
firm-level  change.  The reasons are simple: (a) banks must do their share in enforcing the hard
budget constraint; (b) the major initial adjustments  needed are to save on energy and material
consumption  (the upward trend in material and energy  costs as prices approached  world levels is
evident from Figs. 3-7), and to shed labor.  Neither adjustment  is in the interest of worker-
controlled  firms, the first requiring investments  in updating  iechnology,  which is in conflict with
short-term wage increases, and the second hampered  by the natural reluctance  to release labor
(with a preference for pay cuts instead). The obvious solution  is to change the incentive  structure
at the firm-level.
Microeconomics  of the ETP
In its first two years, the ETP has concentrated  on allocative  efficiency  in the gQ06
market by getting relative  prices right through trade liberalization  and the fixed exchange  rate.
Factor markets for credit and labor received  little attention.
The hope has been that "big bang' privatization  would deal with incentive  issues  stemming
from poor motivation  and lack of clarity in firm-level  accountability  and responsibility.30
Lastly, various triggers (at first based on arrears in dividend  tax payments, extended in
September 1991  to all arrears to the budget) were announced  to deal with exit and bankruptcy; but
the implementation  process had not established  credibility  during the first two years of the ETP.
In the meanwhile, "big bang" privatization,  hampered by legislative, institutional  and
implementation  hurdles has not yet materialized;  and the 1991 collapse  of the enterprise  sector has
led to the emergence  of a debate on industrial  policy, oscillating  between two extremes: leave
everything to market forces; intervene on a case-by-case  basis.
The sample findings reported in this study have a few clearcut implications  for
strengthening  the microeconomic  basis of the ETP, all based on the view that industrial  policy
should be designed  to facilitate the transition to fully functioning  markets by: addressing  SOE
governance in the transition to eventual privatization;  speeding  up the creation  of factor markets
for labor and capital; creating a favorable and welcoming  climate for foreign investors;  providing
training and technical services to firms in marketing,  finance and management;  introducing  tax
reform and disseminating  market information. Some of these issues are elaborated  upon below.
SOE Governance in Transition  to Privatization
The present self-governance  structure, with the dominance  of the Workers' Council, is in
conflict with long-term restructuring and profit (or value added) maximization. The finding that
manak-s  are the source of change suggests  that a richer concept of commercialization  (in contrast
to a temporary transfer to the Ministry of Privatization  pending privatization,  which leads to
paralysis of action in the interim) needs to be developed, that will delegate  power to managers  at
the firm level and empower them to make all operational  and most strategic  decisions  without
consultation;  award them management  contracts and link compensation  to the long run value of
the firm and its privatization;  clarify ownership  of lands, buildings  and other assets. Firms should
be divested of worker housing, vacation resorts, hospitals,  schools and other non-production
related assets and concentrate  on their basic business. Commercialization  should be speeded  up
not only to clarify accountability  and responsibility  at the firm-level, but also to pave the way for
privatization  and ease the way for foreign investors, who will feel more comfortable  dealing with
commercialized  entities where ownership has been clarified. This is important,  as foreign
investors can bring with them the funds, and managerial, technological  and marketing  knowhow
badly needed for restructuring, a lacuna fully recognized  by SOE managers  - recall  Table 8.
Factor Markets for Credit and Labor
The sample  evidence  suggests that "good" firms do not want to borrow and instead  of
quitting, "bad" firms prefer to borrow and double the odds.  The obvious  solution  to this adver ^
selection problem is to have better banking supervision  and rely more on credit rating and
business plan assessment  to weed out the "bad" firms.  Unless  this is done, the necessary  resource
re-allocation  and hardening of the budget constraint  will not occur, the banking  function  then
becoming a bottleneck  to adjustment  and the supply response. The participation  of foreign  banks
will not only help with skills and competition  in the banking  system, but also provide a positive
signal to foreign investors.
The present system of wage indexation  has three disadvantages:  (a) high frequency  of
(monthly)  adjustment; (b) permitting  carryover of norm, leading to "memory"  in the price-wage
relationship,  hence inflation  inertia; (c) perpetuation  of firm-level  wage setting, with wages being
determined by individual  firm gross value added  rather than by a labor market, where skills and
productivity  play a role.  However, with or without indexation,  there are three important  issues31
suggested by the sample findings. First, how to counterbalance  wage pressure and lengthen  the
decision-making  time horizon, so that restructuring investments  are not sacrificed  for short-run
wage increases; second, how to increase  labor mobility;  third, what to do with the increase in
unemployment  that will inevitably  accompany  any major restructuring  effort.
Commercialization  and the empowerment  of managers, combined  with a stronger role
played by banks in making loan decisions  in the context of restructuring  and business  plans will
offer some counter pressure to wages. The important  issue of labor mobility  requires  the creation
of a housing market, at present non-existent. Lastly, much more thinking is needed for dealing
with the unavoidable  surge in unemployment  that will accompany  restructuring. The budget is
already strained and it is not feasible to put displaced  workers on the dole without leading  to
higher inflation.
Managerial Training
Despite the dynamism  of managers, few have received formal  training in modem
marketing and management;  and by definition  lack operating experience  in a market system.
Exposure even to short, intensive  courses could yield high returns, through those directly trained
as well as through those who learn from them.  This need for human  capital is vast and as such,
must be treated as a public investment  problem, because  the private sector has neither  the
resources nor incentive  to impart training on the scale needed.
Tax reform
Serious thought should be given to relating dividends  to profits rather than the historical
share of the founders' fund in enterprise assets, which includes  vacation  resorts, hospitals,  schools
and other assets that are not usually linked  with firms in market economies. However, such a
change will be effective only as part of a comprehensive  restructuring  of SOEs, including
commercialization;  otherwise it may create a perverse incentive  to pay even higher wages,
lowering profits further, in a pre-emptive  bid to escape profit-related  dividends.
Monopoly  and Industrial  Organization  Policy
Many empirical examples  indicate  that price monopoly  power and monopoly  profits are
not serious problems in Polish manufacturing  owing to import competition. However, much work
can be done in terms of industrial  organization,  streamlining  old kombinats  based on size and
employment,  product compatibility  and degree of vertical integration;  and finding  urgently  a
solution to the non-production  related assets of large SOEs."'
1 2Absence  of competition in services, (e.g. banking) is quite another issue, with anecdotal evidence suggesting
oligopolistic behavior by banks.  Once again, a good dose of competition from foreign banks would be highly effective.32
Sample and Data Description  Annex I
The study focused on the biggest  state-owned  enterprises  (SOE's) in 5 manufacturing
sectors: (a) metallurgy; (b) electromachirery;  (c) chemical;  (d) light; and (e) food-processing.
The SOE's in question  employ 1500-6000  workers, although  some exceed 20,000.  Their
annual sales are in the region of $100 m. or more. Products sold by these enterprises  include
pipes, rails, metal sheets, wire; machine  tools, transformers,  electric engines, railway carriages,
refrigerators, bicycles; fertilizer, plastics, organic  and inorganic chemicals;  fabrics, clothes,
hosiery, shoes and leather goods; meat products, sugar, processed fruit, chocolate,  cigarettes.
Vast majority of the enterprises  are typical, tr3ditional  state-owned  enterprises  with powerful
workers councils, two (or more) trade unions and a management,  that is legally subordinate  to the
workers council.  A handful of the investigated  SOE's were (at the time of the study)  joint-stock
companies  with sole ownership of the state, resulting  in abolition  of workers councils  and freedom
from the dividend tax.  The enterprises  were located  all over Poland, both in the big industrial
centers (Upper Silesia, Krakow, Warsaw, Wroclaw,  Poznan) and smaller cities (South-East
Poland, Szczecin, Torun, Bydgoszcz,  Radom,  Piotrkow  and many more).
The plan was to cover 75 enterprises. Because  of the deep organizational  changes  in the
manufacturing  sector and changing  sales patterns  in the last two years, the last published  edition of
Lista 500 (from 1989) was taken as a reference  point, the list classifying  Polish enterprises
according to different criteria. The 21 biggest  firms by sales from each sector were taken in
anticipation  of lack of participation  of some firms, the complete  reorganization  of others, and even
the disbandment  of some.  Roughly  95 enterprises  were approached, 77 successfully,  i.e. a full or
almost full set of data were obtained.
In metallurgy, information  was collected  on 15 enterprises from both ferrous and non-
ferrous sector, covering 45% of the total employment  in the SOE metallurgy  sector as of Dec.
1989. In chemical industry, 15 enterprises  from all main branches  of the sector (both organic and
non-organic  chemistry) were covered, accounting  for 32% of SOE chemicals  sector employment
as of Dec. 1989.  In light industry, 15 enterprises  covering  all main branches of textile and leather
industries  were included (10% of employment). In food-processing  sector, the situation  was more
difficult, as the biggest firms in 1989  were mainly in meat-processing  and sugar production. The
sample was supplemented  with the leading  chocolate  producer and biggest  fruit-processing
enterprise (8% of employment). All in all, the samples  from the above four sectors are highly
representative  of big enterprises in these sectors. The data obtained  from 16 electromachinery
firms cover a whole spectrum  of branches  (9% of employment). However, owing to high
variance within this sector, the vastly  different fortunes  of the consumer  goods producing  and
producer goods producing parts of the sector, and a particularly  significant  impact  of the CMEA
shock on separate branches of electromachinery,  it is difficult  to claim representativeness  for the
sample in this study.
Data Description:  The data set from each enterprise comprised  statistical information  for the
period June 1989 - May 1991  and answers  to a questionnaire  probing qualitative  changes  in the
firm.
The statistical information  covered: monthly  informaticn  on value of sales, costs of sales,
subsidies, turnover tax, extraordinary  gains and losses, gross profit, tax payments,  net profit,
inventories (total and divided into inventories  of raw materials, work-in-progress  and finished
goods), cash balances, credit outstanding,  interfirm  credit (payables  and receivables),  dollar
deposits, employment, wage bill and popiwek norm - a total of 42 variables; guarterly information33
on total costs incurred, structure  of costs, exports (both to CMEA and non-CMEA  areas) and their
costs, imports (not available  in many firms) - a total of 24 variables;  yearly information  on value
of fixed assets, investment  expenditures,  profit distribution, tax obligations  and tax arrears - a
total of 36 variables.
The questionnaire asked questions about the estimated  volume  of sales, export sales in
1990-91  (in physical  terms), price policy, inventory  management,  organizational  changes, relations
with banks, credit policy, competition,  employment  strategies, short-term  and longer-term
prospects for the firm, and different aspects of adjustment  behavior  in the firms.  Managers were
also asked about the social situation in the enterprises. The questionnaire  consisted  of about 50
questions, mainly of descriptive  character.
Data collection process: The researchers  visited every enterprise at least twice.  During the first
visit, the managers (or the chief accountants,  or both) were informed  about the purpose of the
study and the scope of information  requested. The visits often included  a tour of the production
facilities.
A second visit after some time (typically  after 2 weeks)  was arranged, during which the
managers commented  on their answers in the questionnaire  and  the statistical  forms were
checked.  In virtually  all cases the prepared statistical  data (reported  to GUS as such) had some
serious mistakes that the researchers  tried to correct.  Most of the data were easily available in the
SOE's, but some had to be specially  prepared.  Problems arose when firms underwent
organizational  changes  (e.g., "deconcentration"),  as the information  from different periods was not
comparable. In most cases, the problem was overcome and data were obtained for comparable
units reflecting the reorganization,  with the exception  of 3-4 firms, for which some of the data had
to be skipped.
The visits and prolonged  conversations  with the SOE managers  provided a unique
opportunity to learn about the opinions  and perceptions  of the managers, as well as changes in
their behavior.
The data collection  process, including  pilot testing of the questionnaire  followed  by
subsequent revisions, was completed  over May 15 -July 31 1991, and even in this short period of
time, changes were observed in the situation and mood of enterprises. As time went by, it
became  harder to win cooperation  from managers, who often expressed  disappointment  and
frustration with the economic  policy pursued.  Sometimes,  firms were not ready to disclose certain
information  because  they feared competition,  and because  they generally  became more conscious
about the value of economic  information.34
Firm Maximizing  Behavior  and Nominal  Interest Rates  Annex II
Firms need a certain permanent  stc  of working  capitAl  (which is rolled over) to support
a given flow of output. This need increases  as variable  costs increase and as the flow of output
goes up.  For example, a firm may require an equivalent  of 1.5 months' variable costs in working
capital (raw materials,  work-in-progress,  finished  goods stocks) to support a given level of
production. It may be regarded as solving the following  problem, where it is assumed  for
simplicity  that the firm is a monopolist:
max {p(q)q  -vq -iW -F),
q
where q is output (flow), p is price, v is unit variable  cost (excluding interest), i is the interest
rate (scaled for the period q is being selected, for example,  annual output means the annual
interest rate is taken, if q is monthlv  output, then i is the monthly interest rate), W is working
capital and F is fixed costs.  Further, W can be related  to variable costs by writing  W=kvq,
where k is similarly  scaled to the time period for q.  This yields the formulation
max  {p(q)q  - v(1  +ki)q - F}.  The first order condition  can be massaged  to yield:
p(g)(1 - /e) - v  =  ki,  (1)
where e is the elasticity  of demand. For a horizon of one month (Jan. 1990), k= 1 may be a good
approximation. The LHS of this equation  looks surprisingly like the mark-up over costs net of
interest and suggests  that this mark-up  is being equated with the interest rate.  In other words, a
level of output q will be chosen such that the mark-up  at the margin equals the interest rate on
working capital. Monopoly  is not essential  to this result.  A competitive  producer would merely
require that p 2 v(1  + i), or ((p-v)/v)  2 i.
In extreme  terms, the problem faced by enterprise managers in January 1990  could be
described as a choice  between maintaining  real production  levels with highly uncertain  profit and
incurring 50%-72% in interest on working capital  or shutting down production  and paying  off
working capital thereby making  a marginal  return of 50%-72%, this being the opportunity  cost of
producing. Managers  decided to what extent to produce  and to what extent to retire working
capital.  Needless  to say, there was considerable  uncertainty  about the demand curve, elasticity of
demand and the rise in price of inputs.
Eq. (1) says that rather than compare  the interest rate with inflation,  managers  compare it
with the mark-up  over costs.  Depending  upon how v changes,  one can have a situation  where the
price rise comfortably  exceeds  i, yet the mark-up  falls. In other words, firms may not wish to
borrow even if the real interest rate is negative. According  to this view, output is likely to fall
more where derr.and  is extremely  elastic and input costs rise more.35
Restructuring  and Liquidation  effQo  Annex III
The Polish state owned manufacturing  sector consists roughly of about 3000 enterprises.
For about 1800 mainly big firms, the core of Polish manufacturing,  the Ministry of Industry and
Trade (MOIT) is the founding  organ, the rest being in the domain of the regional authorities.
Arrears to the budget  could trigger an automatic  reaction of the founding organ to initiate
restructuring or liquidation  of an enterprise. In principle, if an enterprise firm does not pay the
dividend for three months, it is subject to such procedure. Effective September 1, 1991  failure to
pay any taxes for three months makes the firm eligible  for restructuring or liquidation.
If a firm becomes "eligible"  it can either be restructured  or liquidated. Restructuring
involves nominating  a new (provisional)  managing director, dissolving  the Workers' Council  and
adopting a program of restructuring. It is assumed  that three months is enough to implement  the
program. If the situation does not improve, the firm is put in a state of liquidation. In this
process, the assets of the enterprise in question  are sold and the proceeds used to repay debt, any
remiander going to the state or piAc  into a joint-venture. As a matter of fact, liquidation  is
perceived as a kind of deep restructuring  rather than literal erasing of the unit.  The latter happens
when a firm is  declared bankrupt  with no capacity  to repay debts by immediate  selling of assets.
The rapidly deteriorating  financial position  of the industrial enterprises in 1991 was
reflected in growing tax arrears, bank debt servicing  problems and rising inter firm credit arrears.
Data as of August 10, 1991  showed that 718 SOEs (from the group of 1800  big firms) had some
arrears to the budget.  About 70%  of tax arrears were accounted  for by unpaid popiwek, about
14% by dividends, 8% turnover tax and 8% income tax.
142 firms had not paid taxes for six months (from February to July) and 367 for three
months (May - July).  The dividend  tax was not been paid on time by 461 enterprises. In sum,
the number of firms needing  some kind of action on the part of the founding organ was
considerable. SOEs appeared  effective in obtaining  permission  to postpone tax payments. The
permission is obtained from the local treasury chamber upon a recommendation  from the founding
organ, stating for example  that the difficulties  of the enterprise are transitory.
Against this background,  the number  of enterprises  declared by the  banks as having lost
"zdolnosc  kredytowa' - creditworthiness  - was modest, only 241 manufacturing  firms at the end
of July 1991. It must be remembered  that  banks (also state owned) are extremely reluctant  to
revoke creditworthiness  as long as there is even a slight chance that firms will repay some of their
obligations.
At the time, MOIT was directly involved  in 126 restructuring cases, a big number to
handle but only a small subset of the total number of firms in perceived  difficulty. As of
September, the 126 firms had been dealt with as follows:
44 firms were in a state of liquidation  because  of the deep and prolonged inefficiency,
18 firms were expected  to be liquidated,
6 firms were declared bankrupt,
1 firm was negotiating  with its creditors,
25 cases were being reviewed without  final decision.
In most of the remaining  30 cases, the Ministry  decided not to intervene, with only 3
firms starting a restructuring  procedure. To intensify  the process, the Industrial Development
Agency had prepared the next group of 20 firms to restructure or liquidate. Only two firms had36
been liquidated  as a consequence  of unviable economic  condition;  several liquidations  had taken
place (up to 200 cases) under the Privatization Law of 13 July 1990, to enable ownership  changes.
A list of 26 enterprises meant for liquid-tion in May 1991 consisted  of 8 units from
electromachinery,  6 from light, 5 from minerals, 4 from mining and 2 from wood and paper.
The list of 126  firms (from September)  showed similar distribution, with electromachinery
represented  by 54 firms and light industry  by 25 firms, with other sectors represented  by 2-9
firms.  In electromachinery,  which is by far the biggest part of the Polish manufacturing,  10 firms
producing agricultural  machines and 15 firms from the electronics  ana precision industry  were in
trouble.  In both cases, economic  problems  seemed severe, the first producing  for the agricultural
sector suffering from a severe liquidity  crisis, the second heavily oriented towards CMEA
markets.  In light industry, woollen mills were heavily represented (10 firms).  From other sectors
the number of big firms was small, with most firms in question  being small units or rendering
auxiliary services  to the main industry (designing  bureaus, "research and production"  centers,
etc.)
Liquidators  are likely to face the following  potential difficulties:
(i) the process of liquidation  could be costly and exceed the  financial resources  of the
enterprise in question. The only source of money is the sale of assets, as the banks are
not willing  to extend any credits.  The severance  payments alone pose frequently  an
insurmountable  barrier for the firms, that usually  lack money even for wages.
Additionally,  firms have to  pay many social  benefits to the workers on maternity  leave or
sick leave.  The proceeds from asset sales are limited and frequently sequestrated  to pay
back taxes.
(ii) the demand for assets is limited  and the supply growing rapidly.  Prices asked are
frequently  too high as they result from book values and do not take into account market
prices.  In the meantime, the debts of the liquidated  enterprise keep mounting.
(iii) to sell the assets, legal questions  connected  with the land ownership  have to be cleared
up, which is extremely time-consuming.
The limited number  of restructuring  and liquidation  efforts undertaken so far can be
explained  both by the lack of necessary  human capital on the part  of the founding organs and
financial resources to cover the costs of the  procedures. Postponement  is risky and clould lead
either to a massive,  unmanageable  collapse or the continued  deterioration  of firms resulting in
their growing indebtedness,  waste of resources and inefficiency.37
Wage Indexation  During the ETP and Regression Results  Annex IV
The scheme may be defined by two equations. The first gives the evolution  of the wage
norm:
(i)  w I =  wn,.,  (1  +  c  w 1),
where  wi, is the wage norm in month t, w",.,  is the norm in the previous month, a, is the
indexation  coefficient (usually  less than 1, on average about 0.6) and wr,  is the inflation  rate in
month t.
The second equation specifies  that the sum of actual monthly wages should not exceed the
sum of norm wages up to that month. If the sum of norm wages ("cumulative  norm") is
exceeded, a tax penalty with highly progressive rates (PPWW)  is levied.  In 1990, the total wage
bill was used as the criterion while defining norm wages. In 1991, norm definition  was based on
average wages (see Blanchard  and Layard (1991)  for more details).
Given an initial condition and by successive  substitution  into equation (i) above, the norm
real wage in month t is given by:
wa, =  wo  1  (I  +  Er.),
P,  Po  (1+  rj)
where the identity  p, = p0  II (1 +  irk)  has been used.  It is obvious from this equation  that so long
as the indexation  coefficient  is strictly less than 1 and inflation  persists, the norm real wage will
continuously  decline.
The regressions were based on the model (details in Pinto (1992)):
wages = f(wage norm, gross value added, increase in credits), or:
W = f(WN, GVA, DCR),
(+)  (+)  (+)
where W and WN refer to cumulative  actual and norm wage payments  respectively;  GVA is
(profit II + depreciation + labor costs), profit II being operating profit, or profit before corporate
income tax; and DCR is the change in credits from banks.'  Profit nI  includes  all "paper"
profits made by firms in 1990; it is reasonable  to assume that workers would not be too concerned
about the niceties  of inflation  accounting  while setting wages.  The preceding specification  also fits
in well with the changed milieu facing the worker controlled  firms, namely, cost plus pricing no
longer feasible, even for so-alled  monopolies,  and the growing importance  of marketing  and
profits with the elimination  of subsidies  and the gradual hardening  of the budget constraint. Firms
could be regarded as facing a two-step maximization  problem: in the first step, GVA is
maximized;  in the second, the distribution  of GVA among  wages, taxes (income,  dividends,
PPWW), investments,  retained earnings  and bonuses is made.
Owing to the cumulative  nature of the wage norm, "nested' regressions  based on the
above model were run to examine  wage evolution  over the successive  quarters (cumulatively)  of
1990; and for the first quarter of 1991, based on a complete  sample of 65 firms.  Annex Table I
13'hc  following  claims  exist  on profit II: income  tax; dividends;  PPWW;  netained  eamings;  wage  bonuse.38
summarizes  the regression results, while Annex Table 2 contains  elasticities  of the wage bill with
respect to the explanatory  variables.
Annex Table 1. Regression Results
Dependent  variable: wage bill
Explanatory Variables
Period  constantlwage NormlValue AddedICredits Adj. R2 F-stat
1990:I  506  0.67@  0.02@  0.00  0.96  510.45
1990:I-II  4391@  0.41Q  0.04@  0.00  0.91  221.27
1990:I-III  85458  0.16@  0.07@  0.09Q  0.92  248.36
1990:I-IV  13978@  0.09*  0.09@  0.07*  0.91  207.29
1991:I  1339  0.718  0.05@  0.00  0.95  389.17
Notes:  @ denotes  significance at 1% level
* denotes significance  at 5% level
Rest are statistically  insignificant
Annex Table 2. Wage bill elasticities
(calculated  at mean values)
Period  I  Wage  Norm  IValue  Addedl Credits
1990:I  0.77  0.19  0.00
1990:I-II  0.46  0.34  0.00
1990:I-III  0.17  0.48  0.09
1990:I-IV  0.10  0.58  0.07
1991:I  0.69  0.23  0.0039
Sectoral Graphs on Real Sales and Finished Goods Stocks  Annex V
Figure 18  Figure 19
Real  Sales  Index  Finished  Goods  Stocks
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